

# *How To Talk Like A Donkey*

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Until he fades away down the colonnaded corridors of the Imperial bureaucracy in Rome, Apuleius's Lucius is an incongruous man. Despite his *bonhomie* in the initial episodes of the *Metamorphoses*,<sup>1</sup> he seems to misstep in all his adventures until he becomes as dissimilar to the man he supposed himself to be as magic had the power to make him. Lucius the donkey was a walking, thinking contradiction in terms, something that logically could not exist because it was two different things at the same time and place and nonetheless did exist—or had to exist in order for Lucius to find salvation. He was, as man-donkey, necessarily impossible and yet necessarily possible. Chance or Fate butted Necessity out of the way when Lucius accidentally stumbled into donkey-hood. This logical contradiction drives Lucius's spiritual comturbations through the famous contortions of the plot of Apuleius's novel.

If this characterization is correct, the incongruity of Lucius is related to a philosophical idea with a long history. F. M. Cornford persuasively argued that

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<sup>1</sup> Cited herein as "*Met.*"

Plato, and Greeks in general, thought of Necessity and Chance as the same, being two aspects of Fate.<sup>2</sup> When in the *Timaeus*<sup>3</sup> Plato said that Necessity and Chance work together in creating the world he made not only an appealing general observation about life but also embedded this Janus-faced view of necessity into the geometry with which the Demiurge created all things. Scholarly attention, though given to understanding the Platonic references, themes, and ideas in *Met.*, has not turned to examining whether shivering naked logic might not lurk among the more poetic philosophical concepts evident in the novel from first to last. Yet Apuleius himself was one of the first we know of to derive implications for Platonic logic from this idea. He wrote a short book about it that was used for centuries in teaching logic: the *Peri Hermeneias*.<sup>4</sup> I have wondered whether Apuleius's discourse about alienated identity in *Met.* reflects his logic of identity and contradiction in *PH.*, for notions of personhood are in general closely linked to notions of discourse. This link is a principle of critical theory, but no one to my knowledge has yet tried to learn about the structure of *Met.* from the concepts of *PH.*

I propose therefore to look in *Met.* for two of Apuleius's notions of the logical relationship of propositions in *PH.* at four levels: first, in the relationships of four characters in two short stories (from the episode of the baker and his wife); second,

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<sup>2</sup> Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 160-77. The idea was canonized by Guthrie and most fluently presented, as usual, by E. R. Dodds in "Plato and the Irrational," in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 65 (1945), pp. 16-25

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Timaeus* 47e-48e.

<sup>4</sup> Cited herein as "*PH.*" The two principal studies are the edition with commentary by Londey and Johanson *PH.* (the editorial matter of *PH.* is cited herein as "Londey.") and the extensive technical study of its logic by Sullivan 1967. Regen also accepts it as authentic but does not include it in his book on Apuleius as a Platonist. For other modern logical studies, see p. 124, n. 1 of W. L. Gombocz, "Apuleius Is Better Still: A Correction to the Square of

in the development throughout the novel of one major concept (*voluptas*); third, as to the influence ideas from logic might have on the neo-Platonic ideas in *Met.* that are widely recognized; and fourth, as to the inspiration of the novel as a whole. I do this as a tentative to see how far the project might be worth pursuing. To my observation,<sup>5</sup> as detailed below, the thesis that Apuleius brought the logical side of his neo-Platonism in *Metamorphoses* as fully as he brought the religious side is valid, but the pursuit to uncover a logical or mathematic structure will be very difficult.

To begin with, I stipulate that *PH.* is authentically attributed to Apuleius.<sup>6</sup> The first argument that it was spurious, in 1842, was quickly controverted on narrow grounds. Both modern studies of *PH.* have argued vigorously and at length that it is authentic,<sup>7</sup> while those others who mention it in passing are more reserved.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps scholars do not take *PH.* into account because they have the impression that it is dull.<sup>9</sup> It is true that treatises on logic do not read like novels, but whether or not *PH.* is of interest to students of *Met.* remains to be seen until study such as the one I am trying out in this paper will have been done. If there are sufficiently impressive references in *Met.* to concepts from *PH.*, let them be placed in the scales on the side

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Opposition...,” in *Mnemosyne*, Fourth Series, vol. 43, fasc. ½ (1990), pp. 124-131.

<sup>5</sup> This paper concerns *PH.* solely, and I make no account of any ideas about logic or of any philosophical ideas at all in Apuleius’s other non-fiction.

<sup>6</sup> In manuscripts *PH.* was attributed to Apuleius both as a separate work and as the third part of *De Platone*. Q.v., Carl Schlam’s review of Beaujeu (*v. infra*, n. 10) in *The Classical World*, vol. 69, no. 3 (November, 1975), p. 215.

<sup>7</sup> Sullivan 1967, pp. 9-14; the better discussion is Londey, pp. 11-19.

<sup>8</sup> Hunink, p. 21; Lee, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> According to Harrison, p. 7 the treatise is “in dry technical language which offers little of stylistic or literary interest.”

of Apuleian authenticity.<sup>10</sup>

Short as it is, *PH.* presented such a considerable package of logical complexities that it was part of the “Old Logic,” the batch of texts from late antiquity and dominated by Boethius, that were the standard study for students until the twelfth century.<sup>11</sup> Historians of logic have kept the text alive. The full analysis of just one portion of its theories and formulae requires more than a hundred pages in the authoritative study.<sup>12</sup> Such work does not give us an answer for the rhetorical approach to the logic, just as literary studies of the novel can give answers to this fictionalist approach to the logic only if we find enough material in the logic for literary scholars to proceed in this direction. I’ll explain two of Apuleius’s logical concepts that I will use in looking at *Met.* and then make some points about the rhetorical character of *PH.*, before turning to *Met.*

*PH.* is most famous in the history of logic for including the first appearance of “The Square of Opposition” (illustrations 1 and 2, attached).<sup>13</sup> This, like the multiplication table—another invention of Late Antiquity<sup>14</sup>—is instantly recognizable as one of the great examples of schematizing knowledge for pedagogic

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<sup>10</sup> *PH.* is not included in Jean Beaujeu’s *Apulée: opuscules philosophiques* (Paris, Belles Lettres, 1973) because he considered it “apocryphal.”

<sup>11</sup> Sullivan 1970, pp. 788-789.

<sup>12</sup> Sullivan 1967, pp. 22-138.

<sup>13</sup> *PH.* 5. The two attached pages are Londey pp. 86-89. The text principally describing the Square is that on pp. 86/87, preceding the illustration. The text below the illustration is analysis of the figure.

<sup>14</sup> It first appears in the works of Nicomachus of Gerasa, who was, interesting, a neo-Platonist fascinated with logic and number, as Apuleius appears to have been.

purposes.<sup>15</sup> But its purpose is not solely heuristic. The two *incongruae* propositions, on the left and right sides of the top of the square, never can be true at the same time and nonetheless are sometimes false at the same time. Thus, when some pleasures are good, both are false at the same time, but never is there a time when every pleasure is both a good and not a good. The two propositions along the bottom line, which are the mirror-image of the *incongruae*, are called *subpares*. They are never false at the same time and yet sometimes are true at the same time. Thus, to confirm that some pleasure is a good does not make it impossible that some other pleasure is not a good. As the figure indicates, Apuleius shows how the truth of each proposition relates to the truths of the others. This is the beginning of the twists and turns of thought the Square of Opposition inspires. For the first of the two Apuleian logical concepts that I will use, note that of all the kinds of inconsistency and contradiction possible in logic, Apuleius selects two for his *formula quadrata* : one kind in which neither of the pair of propositions totally validates the other at all times, and one kind in which neither of the pair of propositions totally invalidates the other at all times.

Whenever we make a match of two propositions from the diagonal corners of the Square, each match, or syllogism, results, like a marriage, in new necessary statements, of which some are true and some of which are not, although they all seem to logically entailed. In fact, Apuleius's name for the syllogism is *conjugatio*.<sup>16</sup> It is

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<sup>15</sup> In twentieth-century logic it is widely, though not universally, rejected as invalid, dubbed "A Logicians Fairy Tale" by H. L. A. Hart, in *Philosophical Review*, vol. 60 (April, 1951), pp. 198-212, with a list of other papers by modern logicians on the Square.

<sup>16</sup> *PH*. 7 and 9; *q. v.* Sullivan, pp. 76-138 and Londey, pp. 43-49.

here where we find the second of the two Apuleian logical concepts that I will use: Apuleius says when we pair together the *alterutrae* (or alternate) propositions: if we add a negation to each of the pair of alternates, they mean the same thing.<sup>17</sup> Thus, “Not every pleasure is a good” has the same meaning as “Some pleasure is not a good.” Statements that are opposite when affirmative become identical when negative. As negatives (or *subneutrae*), both stand or fall together. Apuleius therefore calls such matched statements *aequipollentes*.<sup>18</sup> When two different arrangements of words mean the same thing they are “equipollent.”

In *PH*. Apuleius, inventive as ever, devised his own vocabulary of terms in logic, differing from those used by other logicians and peculiar to himself.<sup>19</sup> The first examples we saw are *incongruae* and *subpares* are his own invention, as is the use he makes of *conjugatio*; *aequipollens* may well be an outright neologism. Many of his usages are suggestive to readers interested in rhetoric. Here are a few from the complete list:<sup>20</sup> *oratio pronuntiabilis* for *axioma*; *pugna* for logical opposition or conflict in truth-value; and *rogamentum* for statement. He uses *per impossible* for *reductio ad absurdum*. Apuleius was the first to use *propositio* instead of *protasis* and thus introduced the word “proposition” to logic.

Apuleius himself gives a good general picture of his work when he says that

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<sup>17</sup> *PH*, 5.

<sup>18</sup> *PH*, 5.

<sup>19</sup> Londey, pp. 53ff.

<sup>20</sup> Londey, pp. 72-79.

the subject of *PH.* is the *ars disserendi*.<sup>21</sup> He never uses the word logic, and “*peri hermeneias*” appears only in manuscript incipits and explicits.<sup>22</sup> His concern is with speech-acts or utterances (*oratio*) rather than with the logic of classes or predicates or anything else. Londrey gives a good explanation of the significance of this:

This very direct connection (of propositions) with discourse means that ...for Apuleius propositions are what human talkers entertain, consider, entertain and, above all, accept or reject. Thereby committing themselves to accepting or rejecting other propositions.<sup>23</sup>

His is an assertoric logic, devoted to the power of words to shape those meanings we judge to be true or false.<sup>24</sup> He locates this power in the way assertions require our commitment to other assertions, although they might or might not be consistent, in part or in whole, with one another. In this regard, the assertoric logic of *PH.* is a system of rhetorical devices for pairing and separating contradictory and overlapping meanings—for exposing what is necessary and what is not even when both of these seem to co-exist at the same and in the same place.

As a rhetorical device, assertoric logic can expose a true set of relations out of an untrue or seemingly untrue set of relations. The unlikely union of things

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<sup>21</sup> *PH.* 1.

<sup>22</sup> Sullivan, p. 17.

<sup>23</sup> Londrey, p. 39.

<sup>24</sup> Sullivan 1967, pp. 16-21 and Sullivan 1970, p. 790.

contrary in whole or in part, by happy or by unhappy resolution, is a common event and a common theme in *Met.*, where verbs and nouns beginning with *com-* or *con-* often appear, including terms for the many absurd marriages that Lucius observes. One of them is that of the husband Barbarus and his wife Arete, whose story involves another pair: the slave Myrmex, attached to Barbarus; and the lover Philesitherus, attached to Arete. Lucius, having been sold by Philebus (who, like Plato's Philebus, believes that feelings of pleasure and delight are what is good and, also as in Plato, quickly leaves the scene of action) to a kindly baker,<sup>25</sup> hears this story because he overhears the baker's shrewish wife plotting one of her *scaenas fraudulentas*<sup>26</sup> designed to abuse her husband. She, in turn, is told the story by her accomplice in arranging these deceptions. In telling the story she mentions the cast of characters in the following order: Philesitherus, Barbarus, Arete, Myrmex.<sup>27</sup> Of these four, the first and fourth are the pair of actors outside the marriage and are incongruous, one being a handsome and ardent youth, the other being a craven and greedy servant; one is *constantissimus* in pursuing women and the other serves his master *summa diligentia*; and they at first are opponents and then co-conspirators joined by greed and lust. The second and third persons named in the story are inside the marriage, being the husband and the wife, and may be called nearly equal, or *subpares*. Philesitherus and Myrmex are never honest, or "true," at the same time and are sometimes dishonest, or "false," because they both betray the trust of others and of one another. Barbarus, on the other hand, is not "false" to Arete, and in the end the

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<sup>25</sup> *Met.* 9.10.

<sup>26</sup> *Met.* 9.15.

<sup>27</sup> *Met.* 9.16-7.

two are returned to harmony. Philesirethus and Arete as “false” persons—as betrayers—are in the same situation or equipollent. Barbarus and Myrmex are equipollent when one is deceived and the other successfully hides his guilt. They both are “negated.”

Magic can act on events as logic does on assertions. The baker’s wife wants a adventure similar to the one she’s just been told, with good sex for herself and secret humiliation for her husband. Her accomplice is up to providing it.<sup>28</sup> Here again we have not the Love Triangle but the Love Quadrangle, all unnamed: baker, wife, accomplice, and loverboy. The accomplice brings loverboy to the baker’s wife, though he must be hidden under a wooden tub when the baker unexpectedly returns home. (In the middle of their story parenthetically comes yet another story about the fuller’s unfaithful wife whose lover choked to death on sulphur gas when discovered in hiding by the fuller.) The boy is discovered, and the baker punishes him by raping him and flogging him; subsequently the wife successfully engages a witch to kill the baker. Our interest here is not so much in the structure of the quadrangle but instead in the role of magic role in the turns of events. Lucius, whom magic has made a combination of the contrary beings man and donkey, exposes the weak trick of making a man disappear in a wooden tub; and the witch’s magic kills the baker after he divorces his unfaithful wife. Magic first combines unlikely opposites and then turns one thing into its opposite (the live baker into the dead one). Along with these events *licentiosa Fortuna*<sup>29</sup> breaks up (*dispergit*) the baker’s home, just as it might be

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<sup>28</sup> *Met.* 9.22.

<sup>29</sup> *Met.* 9.31.

said to have brought the loverboy the misfortune of being discovered hiding under the tub. The magical events force accidental events. Each event features the fate, either by force or by chance, of a combination of unlikely parts. And finally Lucius himself is led by these magical misfortune into the next chapter of the journey he started by accident but is required to complete.

Lucius's magical journey causes him to change the content of his assertions about important concepts as a result of his experiences. One of these is *voluptas*. In the beginning he is a short-sighted buccaneer in love. In the story of Cupid and Psyche, Venus is the opposite of desirable. She is *non gratia, non lepos, sed incompta et agrestia et horrida*.<sup>30</sup> At the end of the novel, though, desire is gratified by a different goddess, Isis (who is *caelestis Venus*<sup>31</sup>), when Lucius the man says that *inexplicabili voluptate simulacri divini perfruebar*.<sup>32</sup> The result fulfills Apuleius's injunction to the reader at the beginning: *laetaberis!*,<sup>33</sup> whereas during the course of his misadventures he was subject to the power of cruel fortune, such as when he is told that *non diutius...laetaberis* and shall die.<sup>34</sup> In *PH*. Apuleius says that the only true parts of speech are nouns and verbs (including *esse*), because they can be true or false, the other parts named by grammarians being *adplustra*.<sup>35</sup> One of the purposes of *PH*. is to confute developments in logic associated with the Stoics that were

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<sup>30</sup> *Met.* 5.38.

<sup>31</sup> *Met.* 11.2.

<sup>32</sup> *Met.* 11.24.

<sup>33</sup> *Met.* 1.1.

<sup>34</sup> *Met.* 7.27.

<sup>35</sup> *PH.* 4.

concerned with more formal and abstract matters than the truth-relations of human *oratio*. It is, Apuleius says, the doctrine of Plato,<sup>36</sup> that the concern of philosophy is the truth of propositions, which necessarily lies in the truth of nouns and verbs, even though either can *in plura verba protendere*. Pleasure, as the noun *voluptas* or the verb *laetaberis* (as well as the other forms of these and other words for the concept of pleasure), is good or bad, and we must examine the truth or falsity of claims that a pleasure is good or bad by examining whether the experience in question is truly a pleasure or not. Apuleius's principle example for the Square of Opposition is assertion that every pleasure (*voluptas*) and that some pleasure is a good or not a good. Some pleasures are good but not every pleasure, and some but not all pleasures are not good. Throughout *PH*, he uses other examples, such as animals breathing or not and horses neighing or not, but most of his propositions concern such moral matters as the just, the honorable, and the useful. A metamorphosis by magic is like equipollence: the same thing continues different descriptors (or other terms), but the original, primitive truth or falsity remains valid. In life, this drives events, whether they appear necessary or chancy or both, as they do when magically enspelled. Socrates said that the true will leads us to the good.<sup>37</sup> The change in assertions about pleasure, which occurs when Lucius changes his mind about things, is a good example of a Platonic notion that the highest reality is hidden by error and that deception stands between Truth and us.

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<sup>36</sup> Apuleius cites the *Theaetetus*. Londrey says Apuleius had in mind 206d but that the passage in which Plato discusses this is *Sophist* 261-262.

<sup>37</sup> Plato, *Republic* 6.490c.

Lucius's epistemic adventure is to try to understand his incongruous identity as Lucius *asinus*. In the full sweep of the narrative his adventure is one of development from Lucius *musculus*<sup>38</sup> to Lucius *divinus* or *pius*, to which an epistemic adventure ought to be considered a necessary part. What would it as such be made up of? Magic is an evident part of it. I have suggested that logic is a more occult part of it and Lucius cognitively connects the two. Spiritual experience would be the third part if the epistemic adventure of magic and logic is to be connected to the full narrative. If this is right, we should be able to see concepts from logic or something like a logical schema in the items of the narrative (as in the Love Quadrangle), in its major emotive concepts (as in *voluptas*), in Apuleius's philosophical concepts (as in *Fortuna*), *plus* something reflecting *PH*. in a substantial arc of the narrative.

Consider "Cupid and Psyche" as narrative, setting aside any view of it as predominantly Platonic or psychological or even as allegorical—just as a connected group of fable in the context of *Met*. Lucius the ass hears this collection of tales by listening in to an old woman telling it to a girl who has been assaulted and held captive by robbers, just as Lucius is captive to his fate. The long mythological tale serves as advice and solace to ugly Lucius just as much as it served the girl with the *faciem luculentam*.<sup>39</sup> It is not, however, presented as a solution to his problems. Nothing is presented as a solution: not the rose-bush either, because finding the plant is a problem itself. Lucius the ass is not as capable of problem-solving as *homo rationalis* is: in *PH*. Apuleius, in the course of an example in logic, says that

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<sup>38</sup> *Met*. 6.26.

<sup>39</sup> *Met*. 4.25.

“some animal is a man” is a logically defensible proposition.<sup>40</sup> Lucius’s human part can solve some problems but is blocked by the animal part, his animal part can solve some problems but it also limited by his human part, but the big problem is that he thinks he is supposed to be all human in the face of the fact that he is part animal. The subject of the Cupid and Psyche stories (as stories) is crazy passion. So as the listener (and teller to us), Lucius is faced with the limits of his rationality and of reason in a more general sense.

Apuleius the logician, at the beginning of *PH.*, lists a bunch of kinds of speech that are not subject to truth or falsity:

...imperandi mandandi succensendi optandi vovendi irascendi obiendi  
 inviendi favendi miserandi admirandi contemnendi obiurgandi paenitendi  
 deplorandi tum voluptatem afferendi tum metum.... incutiendi....<sup>41</sup>

Most of this could be a description of the heinous behavior of Venus driving the action in Cupid and Psyche. Her emotions cause her to make both Psyche and Cupid miserable. She beats Psyche like a beast of burden and says her child will be *spurius*.<sup>42</sup> And then, as if to appeal to the rational in Lucius the ass, Venus gives Psyche four tasks.<sup>43</sup> The tasks evoke ancient logical and philosophical puzzles of the separation of natural kinds (the separation of grains), paradoxes of composition

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<sup>40</sup> *PH.* 6.

<sup>41</sup> *PH.* 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Met.* 6.9.

<sup>43</sup> *Met.* 6.10-20.

(seizing a tuft of golden wool), paradoxes of motion (obtaining water from the Cocytus), and the problem of participation (capturing some of Proserpina's beauty in a *pyx*). Taking these as analogues of truth-proven propositions, they do not free Psyche or dispose of Venus. Both fail to live up to their words. The superhuman agency of ambrosia is required in the end to reconcile the two women. Harmony comes when Jupiter proscribes *turpibus adulteriis*.<sup>44</sup>

Lucius tells us all this in retrospect, once he has become again a whole man. In the time of his confusion, when as an ass he listened to these stories, he was capable solely of listening—and, apparently, of remembering—but he could not write it down or subsequently act upon his thoughts or feelings. Apuleius identified logic not with inference but with accepted or rejected proposition that we utter. Only upon utterance can we take a stand on which to act. In this connection, the several instances in which Lucius *asinus* tries to speak but cannot, or wants to act but cannot, might be compact epitomes of Lucius's spiritual dilemma. Finally, after a very moving debate with himself, he impels himself to run for his life, as both an animal and men do when survival is at stake.<sup>45</sup>

“Man,” “animal,” and “rational” are three of the most common terms used in examples of logic from Aristotle onward. It is easy to forget that they were often used because they are very basic and tremendously important. Every instruction about syllogisms using these terms questions what logic, rationality, and humanity are, at the same time as it teaches technique. In *PH*, Apuleius argues for a kind of

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<sup>44</sup> *Met.* 22.

<sup>45</sup> *Met.* 6.26-27.

logic concerned with true and false utterance as a basic constituent of human activity, and he argues against the more abstract logic of inference that the Stoics had begun to develop. He argues for the Platonic approach as the more relevant to our needs as humans—a debate that has never ceased. Further consideration of the relation of *PH.* to *Met.* probably must proceed by considering Apuleius's ideas of *conjugatio* and *collectio*, which occupy at least of *PH.* and which are responses to the Stoics. I have not broached them in this paper, although *conjugatio* is an especially resonant word because it refers to the “yoke of necessity,” to the linking of things (such as donkey and man), and to sexual union.

In order to retrieve his human identity, Lucius wants to make sense of his experiences. His capacity for doing so is limited by being a man, by being the sort of fellow Lucius is, and by becoming a donkey. His physical and religious conversions coincide. They resolve his “elastic identity,” the lost logical order of things, and the other illusions, hallucinations, and displacements of his victimhood.<sup>46</sup> The history of interpretation of *Met.* has tortured itself over a similar problem in trying to make sense of the novel: from deciding it makes no sense<sup>47</sup> to interpreting it as a story of religious conversion,<sup>48</sup> to seeing it as a story about change,<sup>49</sup> to seeing it as a detective story<sup>50</sup> or as a fable, to a couple of attempts at finding a neo-Platonic

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<sup>46</sup> Kanaan pp. 250, 278 *et pass.*

<sup>47</sup> Perry, Ben, “An Interpretation of Apuleius' Metamorphoses,” in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 57, (1926), pp. 238-260.

<sup>48</sup> Shumate, Nancy. *Crisis and conversion in Apuleius' Metamorphoses.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.)

<sup>49</sup> James, Paula. *Unity in diversity: a study of Apuleius' Metamorphoses....* (Hildesheim and New York: Olms-Weidmann, 1987.)

<sup>50</sup> Winkler, pp. 89-93. Winkler's approach includes many other elements.

arithmetic template for the narrative,<sup>51</sup> and to numerous psychological and Freudian readings.<sup>52</sup> The first to recognize the spiritual side or character of *Met.* was Thomas Taylor the Platonist, a full century before Perry decided that the book was just a sort of joke. If we admit religious and neo-Platonic ideas into our understanding of the novel, it makes sense to look at the Platonic view of both the capabilities and limitations of logic, because he viewed them as expression of the role of reason in the universe, sometimes called Fortune or Necessity. Plutarch taught that the religion of Isis was compatible with Platonism because Osiris and Isis are “the deities of order and reason; against them stands Typhon, the principle of irrationality and disorder”; order prevails but never does wholly eliminate the disordered chaos.<sup>53</sup> Is this not the view of the priest who teaches the Lucius whom Isis has restored to personhood after a season as the victim of Fortune that:

In tutelam iam receptus es Fortunae, sed videntis, quae suae lucis splendore ceteros etiam deos illuminat.<sup>54</sup>

Men, both good ones and bad ones, share qualities with the non-human, whether donkey or demon, but they can share wisdom with only with the gods.<sup>55</sup> When Lucius fades into the crowd of other men in the last words of Apuleius’s novel, he

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<sup>51</sup> Heller’s view on the division into eleven books seems both too rigid and to weak a schema, but I cannot say my attempt at counting in the case of Love Quadrangle is any better. Perry, *op. cit. supra*, has an interesting reference I have not been able to follow up on: on pp. 250, n. 6 and 251 n. 28 he refers to an article from 1925 that attempts, unsuccessfully in his view, to find a regular mathematical structure in *Met.*

<sup>52</sup> These are well summarized in Gollner, pp. 81-106.

<sup>53</sup> Walsh 1981, pp. 23-254.

<sup>54</sup> *Met.* 11.15.

<sup>55</sup> This is Augustine’s interpretation, in *Civitas Dei* 9.8, of the view of human and demonic nature in Apuleius’s *De Deo Socrates*.

has become and he remains outside of the crowd, his identity made distinct from them by his inner wisdom as to truth and by the mark of his tonsure. He had learned how to talk like a donkey in order to learn how to talk like a human.

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